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Abstract: 
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning 
what an agent would freely do if they were in certain circumstances even partly determines that 
agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in 
the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and 
then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism through the lens of consequentialism. After 
examining their respective benefits and drawbacks, we argue that, contrary to what has been 
assumed, actualism and securitism both succumb to the so-called nonratifiability problem. In 
making this argument, we develop this problem in detail and argue that it’s a much more serious 
problem than has been appreciated. We conclude by arguing that an alternative view, hybridism, 
is independently the most plausible position and best fits with the nature of consequentialism, 
partly in light of avoiding the nonratifiability problem.  
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1. Introduction 
We will use the term consequentialism to pick out views in normative ethics which hold that the 
deontic status of an act-set is solely a function of the net value of the consequences of performing 
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the act-set in question, relative to the net value of the other act-sets that the agent can perform.1,2 
Consequentialist views are demarcated from one another by (i) their evaluative rankings of 
outcomes and, more fundamentally, (ii) their account of the features that determine the evaluative 
rankings of outcomes. For example, with respect to (i), two consequentialist views may disagree 
about whether an outcome in which one billion people are prevented from experiencing a headache 
is better than an outcome in which one innocent person is prevented from dying. With respect to 
(ii), this disagreement may be the result of each view identifying different intrinsic goods and bads. 
Perhaps preventing one billion people from experiencing a headache maximizes hedonic utility, 
while preventing the innocent person from dying maximizes preference satisfaction.3  
Category (ii) ranges over a wide variety of issues, though the literature on consequentialism 
has primarily focused on identifying the correct axiology (e.g. what is intrinsically good and bad), 
identifying the types of reasons that exist (e.g. moral, prudential), and identifying their respective 
weights. These distinctions do not exhaust the differences between consequentialist views, 
however. Any form of consequentialism must also take a stance on the scope of possible acts that 
are relevant options for the agent given certain facts about how an agent would (or might) freely 
act under certain circumstances. These issues center around the nature of control that an agent must 
have over their behavior, both in the immediate future and across one’s life, and are relatively 
                                                        
1 Cf. Dreier (2011: 97) and Portmore (2009: 330; 2011: 34-38).   
2 We will suppose that an agent S performs an act-set (singleton or plural) x at time t iff x is a possible state of affairs 
involving an action (or a number of actions) that belong(s) to S and x is actualized at t. 
3 When such cases are discussed in the literature, the focus of the disagreement is about whether there is a lexical 
priority between values. See Norcross (1998) and Dorsey (2009).  
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recent in the history of ethics. The question of the scope of an agent’s options most notably arises 
in the actualism/possibilism (A/P) debate, which is the focus of this paper.4  
 The A/P debate may be illustrated with the following case. Suppose that you’ve just been 
invited to an ex-partner’s wedding, and while you can attend the wedding and be pleasant at little 
cost to yourself, you’re also prone to fits of jealousy. The best act-set you can perform involves 
<accepting the invitation, attending the wedding, and staying sober>, ensuring that everyone has 
a good time. The worst act-set you can perform involves <accepting the invitation, attending the 
wedding, and getting inebriated>, thereby ruining the wedding for everyone. The act-set that is 
neither the best nor the worst involves <declining the invitation, and doing something else besides 
attending the wedding>.5 Finally, suppose that if you were to decide to accept the invitation today, 
then you would, in fact, decide to get inebriated once you’re at the wedding. 
The question at the root of the A/P debate is whether you are obligated to accept or decline 
the wedding invitation. This question is particularly important for consequentialists since they 
must take a stance on whether true counterfactuals of freedom (CFs)—true subjunctive 
                                                        
4 These issues also feature centrally in certain debates about deontic logic and the related maximalism/omnism debate, 
which we’ll briefly discuss in section 2.   
5 This case is drawn from Zimmerman (2006: 153). Since this chapter is focused on the actualism/possibilism debate 
as it applies to consequentialism, the ranking of outcomes should be understood to be determined by intrinsic value, 
as opposed to deontic value.   
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conditionals concerning what an agent S would freely do at t2 if S were in circumstances C at t1—
even partly determine an agent’s moral obligation to perform some act-set.6,7  
There are four types of views in the debate, viz. possibilism, actualism, securitism, and 
hybridism, and each of these types admits of multiple distinct precisifications. In response to the 
central question of the debate, possibilists and some hybridists believe that, necessarily, true CFs 
do not even partly determine an agent’s obligations, while actualists, securitists, and some 
hybridists believe that true CFs can at least partly determine an agent’s obligations. So, with 
respect to the wedding invitation example, actualist forms of consequentialism maintain that you 
are obligated to decide to decline the invitation at least partly because what would actually happen 
if you were to decide to decline is better than what would actually happen if you were to decide to 
accept. Possibilist forms of consequentialism hold that you are obligated to decide to accept 
because doing so is part of the best act-set you can perform over time. Securitist and hybridist 
forms of consequentialism are a bit more complex. We will have to consider more detailed versions 
of the wedding invitation case before we are in a position to explain the implications of these 
views. 
Our aim is to elucidate the differences between actualist, possibilist, securitist, and 
hybridist forms of consequentialism and, in doing so, explore the benefits and drawbacks of each 
                                                        
6 The A/P debate has typically focused on CFs in which ‘C’ refers to S’s performing an action x at t1. It also seems to 
conceive of freedom in terms of having an ability to do otherwise. This is because everyone in the debate implicitly 
assumes that an agent can do something, such that if they were to do it, then some true CF would be false instead 
(Cohen & Timmerman 2016: 4). 
7 The circumstances ‘C’ must refer to (temporally intrinsic) maximally specified circumstances at some time in order 
to accommodate the fact that adding information into the antecedent of a counterfactual can alter its truth-value 
(Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973; Jackson, 1985: 178, 186).  
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from a consequentialist perspective. This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide 
some historical context, briefly explaining how a supposed puzzle for utilitarianism within the 
context of deontic logic gave rise to the actualism/possibilism literature, and then in section 3 we 
discuss time’s crucial relationship to abilities and obligations. In sections 4-8 we review possibilist, 
actualist, securitist, and hybridist forms of consequentialism in more detail, and argue that 
hybridism, in one form or other, is both the most plausible view and best captures the nature of 
consequentialism, partly in light of avoiding the so-called nonratifiability problem as discussed in 
section 7.  
 
2. Consequentialism and Deontic Logic  
The purpose of this section is to trace the historical origins of the A/P debate and its relation to 
consequentialism. The debate arose partly from Hector-Neri Castañeda’s (1968) argument that 
utilitarianism is formally incoherent. Here’s the concise version. Castañeda first assumed that 
utilitarians accept a principle of deontic logic known as “obligation distributes through 
conjunction.” This principle holds that if an agent S is obligated to do both A and B, then S is 
obligated to do A and S is obligated to do B (1968: 141). This principle may be represented more 
formally as follows.  
 
Obligation Distributes Through Conjunction: O(A & B) → O(A) & O(B) 
 
This principle, hereafter (ODC), can be illustrated with the wedding invitation case. If you are 
obligated to <accept the wedding invitation and stay sober at the wedding>, then you are obligated 
to <accept the wedding invitation> and you are obligated to <stay sober at the wedding>.  
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Second, Castañeda (1968: 142) argued that (ODC) is inconsistent with the following 
principle, which he took to be a basic commitment of utilitarianism.  
 
(U): S is morally obligated to do x in circumstances C iff S’s doing x in C will bring about 
a greater balance of good over bad than her performing any other alternative action open 
to her in C. 
 
To see why (ODC) and (U) are supposedly inconsistent, suppose that an agent S’s performing the 
conjunctive act-set <A & B> brings about a greater balance of good over bad than any alternative 
act-set (singleton or plural) that S can perform. It is supposed to follow from (U) that S is obligated 
to perform <A & B>. Now, given (ODC), it follows that S is obligated to perform <A> and that S 
is obligated to perform <B>. But, given (U), performing <A> would result in more net good than 
performing any alternative, including <B>, and performing <B> would also result in more net 
good than performing any alternative, including <A>. But performing <A> cannot result in both 
more and less net good than performing <B>.8 
Dag Prawitz (1970) and Fred Westphal (1972) responded to Castañeda by modifying (U) 
in such a way that the actions are indexed to the time they would need to be performed in order to 
bring about the uniquely optimific outcome. On their suggested revision, if performing the joint 
act <A & B> from t1-t2 would result in the greatest net amount of good, then S is obligated to 
                                                        
8 Lars Bergström (1968: 43) responded to Castañeda’s argument against utilitarianism by pointing out that the 
contradiction arises only if it is assumed that <A> and <B> are alternatives in the relevant sense, but <A> and <B> 
are not, in fact, alternatives since the agent can consistently perform both of them.  
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perform <A> at t1 and to perform <B> at t2. This supposedly avoids the contradiction because <A> 
supposedly is the act-set at t1 that would produce the greatest net amount of good in comparison to 
any other act-set performable at t1, whereas <B> supposedly is the act-set at t2 that would produce 
the greatest net amount of good in comparison to any other act-set that is performable at t2. Finally, 
from among the performable act-sets that might occur from t1-t2, <A & B> is the act-set that would 
produce the greatest net amount of good in comparison to any other act-set that is performable 
from t1-t2. Thus, each act-set is the uniquely optimific one at the time(s) it is performed.9 
Harold Zellner (1973) demonstrated that indexing actions to times will not solve the 
supposed problem Castañeda identified for utilitarianism. While performing <A & B> from t1-t2 
may be uniquely optimific, it does not follow that performing either of these individual acts at their 
respective times would be uniquely optimific. For instance, performing <A> at t1 may not be 
uniquely optimific if the agent would not perform <B> at t2 if she were to perform <A> at t1. This 
point may be illustrated with the following case. 
 
Covering Class: The best act-set Bill can perform is <A & B> from t1-t2, where <A> = 
agree to teach Ted’s class next week, and <B> = teach Ted’s class next week. Bill can also 
<C> at t1, where <C> = suggest that George, an inferior instructor, cover Ted’s class 
instead. Finally, suppose that if Bill were to <A> agree to teach Ted’s class next week, he 
would <~B> not teach class. 
                                                        
9 Notably, Prawitz (1968; 1970) and Westphal (1972) each argued that an act is permissible if and only if it is part of 
an act-set that, if performed, would bring about the greatest net good of any of the act-sets available to the agent. 
Prawitz and Westphal were essentially giving what may be considered the earliest defenses of possibilism, though 
they did not refer to this view as such.    
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Again, it would be best if Bill <agrees to teach and teaches>, second best if he <suggests 
that George cover the class>, and worst if he <agrees to teach and skips teaching>. Thus, the value 
of the act-sets may be ranked from best to worst as follows.  
 
(1) <A & B> 
(2) <C > 
(3) <A & ~B> 
 
Zellner points out that, since Bill would <~B> if he were to <A>, the value of performing <A> is 
not uniquely optimific at t1 even though the value of performing <A & B> from t1-t2 is uniquely 
optimific.10 Thus, in such cases, (U) combined with (ODC) still generates contradictions, even if 
each act-set (singleton or plural) is indexed to their respective times.  
Zellner’s own proposed solution was to reject (U) because it is inconsistent with a 
supposedly basic principle of inference which holds that if an agent is obligated to perform <A> 
and her performing <A> entails her performing <B>, then she is obligated to perform <B> (1972: 
125). This rule, sometimes referred to as Normative Inheritance (NI), may be represented more 
formally as follows (Feldman 1986: 41).  
 
Normative Inheritance: If ⊢ A → B then ⊢ O(A) → O(B) 
                                                        
10 An action that is uniquely optimific at a time is one that is optimific relative to all other performable actions at that 
time.  
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Regardless of whether Zellner’s own response to Castañeda succeeds, cases such as Covering 
Class highlight the important question within the A/P debate as to whether true CFs even partly 
determine an agent’s obligations.  
Since a conjunction entails each of its conjuncts, it follows that (NI) entails (ODC). 
Moreover, a commitment to (NI), and thus to (ODC), suggests that, in addition to an entailment 
relation, there is also a dependence relation between obligatory act-sets. We can distinguish 
between a non-dependent obligation which we have not in virtue of having some other obligation 
and a dependent obligation which we have in virtue of having some other obligation. All non-
dependent obligations are ultimately possessed in virtue of possessing some non-dependent 
obligation (Timmerman & Cohen, 2016: 679; cf. Portmore, 2011: 179).  
Many such theories that are committed to (ODC) or (NI) are forms of maximalism. They 
maintain that, necessarily, the object of a non-dependent obligation for an agent S is a maximal 
act-set, or something close enough.11 A maximal act-set is roughly one that, at some time t, S can 
perform across their entire life up to the last performable act. More precisely, a maximal act-set is 
an act-set that, at some time t, an agent S can perform over time, and it is not contained in some 
other act-set that, at t, S can perform over time. Act-set x is contained in act-set y iff (i) x and y 
belong to the same agent, (ii) the period of time at which x is performed is a proper or improper 
part of the period at which y is performed, and (iii) it is logically necessary that if y is performed 
                                                        
11 We agree with Portmore and Brown that, more exactly, the object of a non-dependent obligation is a maximally 
normatively specific option (or act-set). This is an act-set that is entailed only by normatively equivalent options/act-
sets (Portmore, 2017: 428; Brown, 2018: 13). All of the arguments put forward in this paper regarding the status of 
maximal act-sets similarly apply, mutatis mutandis, to the status of maximally normatively specific options/act-sets. 
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then x is performed (Prawitz, 1968: 80; Sobel, 1976: 199; Portmore, 2011: 177; Brown, 2018: 
752). The final crucial component to maximalism is that every non-maximal act-set that is 
contained in a non-dependent, obligatory maximal act-set is itself the object of a dependent 
obligation. 
In contrast to maximalism, omnism implies that the object of a non-dependent obligation 
may be a maximal or non-maximal act-set because the deontic status of every act-set x, maximal 
and non-maximal, is to be evaluated only in terms of its own value rather than in terms of its 
relation to the value of an act-set y that entails x or which contains x (Portmore, 2017: 429, 431). 
With the exception of the version of actualism to be discussed in section 5, all of the theories to be 
discussed presuppose maximalism, or something similar to maximalism (see footnote 11).  
In the next section, we provide an elaborated version of the wedding invitation case that 
will guide us through the A/P terrain, and we will highlight a number of background assumptions 
that we explicitly adopt in our approach to the debate. 
 
3. Time’s Relationship to Abilities and Obligations 
Before we can explore the views of the A/P debate in detail, we must first discuss time’s role with 
respect to an agent’s abilities and obligations. We’ll do so, in part, through further discussion of 
the aforementioned principles of deontic logic. This will provide the background information 
necessary to understand the subsequent detailed discussion of each of the views in the A/P debate.   
Let’s start by considering an elaborated version of the wedding invitation case, which we’ll 
refer to as Wedding Invitation 1 (WI1). Suppose that Alice and her ex-partner promised each other 
in the past that they would attend each other’s weddings, and that Alice has been invited to her ex-
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partner’s wedding. At t1 Alice is <A>: deliberating about what to do. The following actions are 
ones that, at t1, she can perform in the future: 
 
 Possible actions at t2: 
B = Decide to: accept the wedding invitation, attend the wedding and not drink alcoholic 
beverages from t2-t4 
C = Decide to: decline the wedding invitation at t2, and then go home and do research for 
a paper from t3-t4 
 
Possible actions at t3: 
D = Decide to: attend the wedding and not drink alcoholic beverages from t3-t4  
E = Decide to: go home and play videogames from t3-t4  
F = Decide to: go home and do research for a paper from t3-t4   
G = Decide to: go home and play videogames from t3-t4  
 
Possible actions at t4: 
H = Decide to: not drink alcoholic beverages at t4 
I = Decide to: drink an alcoholic beverage at t4 
J = Decide to: play videogames at t4  
K = Decide to: do research for a paper at t4 
L = Decide to: play videogames at t4 
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All arrows point to what Alice can do at the respective times, but only the solid arrows indicate 
what Alice would subsequently do if she were in certain prior circumstances. Notice, then, that, no 
matter what Alice decides at t2 to do from t2-t4 among the decisions that, at t1, she can make at t2, 
it’s not the case that Alice would perform any of the actions (more specifically, decisions) that are 
preceded at any point in time by a dotted line. The positive and negative numbers represent the 
total net hedonic utility (i.e. the total number of hedons and dolors) of the consequences that would 
be brought about by each of the above act-sets. To keep things simple, let’s suppose that hedonistic 
act-utilitarianism is true, though, to be clear, all arguments put forward in this chapter can 
accommodate any version of consequentialism, including those that posit agent-relative 
constraints and/or pluralism about intrinsic value. Let’s also suppose for simplicity’s sake that, for 
whatever reason, the final act that Alice can perform over time extends no later than t4.   
At t1, <B, D, H> is the best maximal act-set that Alice can perform over time, <B, D, I> is 
the worst maximal act-set that Alice can perform over time, and <C, F, K> is the second-best 
maximal act-set she can perform over time. As a matter of fact, Alice performs the second-best 
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maximal act-set that, at t1, she can perform from t2-t4. Moreover, if Alice were to <B> at t2, then 
she would, in fact, <D> at t3 and <I> at t4. 
With this case in mind, let’s consider what Alice’s abilities are at any given time. It is 
natural, we think, to understand an agent’s present ability to do something as an ability to bring 
about a future event that might occur rather than as an ability to bring about a present event that is 
already happening, though many have suggested that this distinction doesn’t have any significant 
ramifications for the A/P debate.12 We will adopt an exclusively future-oriented approach, 
according to which an agent has a present ability to settle which of the alternative future options 
will be realized. 
 
4. Possibilism 
Now that we have reviewed the relevant background information, we are in a position to dive 
deeper into the A/P debate by considering each of the views in more detail. In this section, we will 
examine possibilism and explain why it is viewed as an attractive position, while also reviewing 
the most compelling objection against it. Here is a more formal definition of possibilism.  
  
Possibilism: At t an agent S is obligated to φ at t' iff S can, at t, φ at t' and φ-ing at t' is part 
of the best act-set that, at t, S can perform from t' until the last time she can perform an act. 
   
According to possibilism, an agent’s sole non-dependent obligation is to perform an optimific 
maximal act-set (i.e. the best act-set agents can perform over the course of their entire lives), and 
they will have dependent obligations to perform the non-maximal act-sets that are contained in 
                                                        
12 Cf. Carlson (1995: 77), Goldman (1976: 453), Bykvist (2002: 47), and Portmore (2011: 166). 
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this non-dependent, obligatory maximal act-set. In WI1, for instance, possibilists hold that Alice 
has a dependent t1-obligation to <B> at t2 in virtue of having a non-dependent t1-obligation to <B, 
D, H> from t2-t4.13  
Possibilism has a number of defenders for a reason. In addition to generating the intuitively 
correct moral verdicts in a wide range of cases, it also comports well with consequentialist 
commitments. Specifically, possibilism captures the most straightforward understanding of the 
idea that agents are obligated to bring about the best outcome they can. It’s for this reason that 
consequentialists14 seem to frequently implicitly assume possibilism in their work. A second set 
of advantages is that possibilism preserves a number of plausible axioms in deontic logic, most 
notably (ODC) and (NI).15 A third set of advantages is that possibilism avoids the primary 
objections to actualism to be discussed in the next section.16 While possibilism no doubt has a lot 
going for it, it also is subject to a variety of objections, one of which is particularly notable.   
                                                        
13 The ability to perform a (non-singleton) act-set over time may be understood in terms of having an ability to perform 
the first act in the act-set, and then, once the first act is performed, they will have the ability to perform the second act 
in the act-set, and once the second act is performed, they will have the ability to perform the third act, etc., culminating 
in the agent’s ability to perform the final act in that act-set. See e.g. Goldman (1978: 193) and Portmore (2011: 165-
166, 170). 
14 This notably includes consequentialist effective altruists. See Timmerman (in press).  
15 Goldman, 1978: 80; Feldman, 1986: 41-44; Zimmerman, 1990: 58-60; Zimmerman, 2006: 154-155; Vessel, 2009; 
Kiesewetter, 2018.  
16 There is more to be said in favor of possibilism that is beyond the scope of this paper. See Zimmerman (1996: fn. 
72 and fn. 122) and (2017: ch. 3) for a nice review of some of possibilism’s additional, lesser appreciated, virtues. 
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The most influential objection to possibilism is that it can generate an obligation that, if 
acted on, would result in the worst possible outcome.17 Possibilism generates this consequence 
because it implies that true CFs do not even partly determine an agent’s obligations. This objection 
may be formulated more precisely as follows.  
 
Worst Outcome Objection: Possibilism entails that an agent S can have an obligation to 
φ even when φ-ing would result in S performing an act-set that is deeply morally wrong 
(perhaps the worst possible act-set) and that is worse than the act-set that S would perform 
if S were to ~φ.   
 
To illustrate, possibilism says that in WI1 Alice has a dependent t1-obligation to <B, D> from t2-t3 
in virtue of having a non-dependent t1-obligation to <B, D, H> from t2-t4. However, if Alice were 
to <B, D>, then she would <I> rather than <H> at t4, resulting in the worst possible outcome. This 
may not sound so counterintuitive in cases where the worst outcome isn’t tragic. Yet, this objection 
has more intuitive force in high-stakes variants. Suppose that, no matter what Alice decides prior 
to t4 to do, if Alice were to drink alcohol at the wedding, then she would drive home drunk, killing 
three pedestrians in the process. Possibilism still renders the verdict that Alice has a non-dependent 
t1-obligation to <B, D> from t2-t3, and it renders this verdict no matter how terrible the 
consequences of doing this happen to be. So, while possibilism can account for consequentialists’ 
judgments that agents are obligated to bring about the best outcome that they can over time, they 
                                                        
17 Goldman, 1976: 469-70; Sobel, 1976: 202-203; Feldman, 1986: 52-57; Almeida, 1992: 461-462; Woodard, 2009: 
219-221; Ross, 2013: 81-82; Gustafsson, 2014: 593; Timmerman & Cohen, 2016: 674. 
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cannot account for consequentialists’ judgments that agents are always obligated to act in ways 
that would bring about the best outcome.    
Possibilists have tried to sugar the pill of the Worst Outcome Objection by emphasizing the 
distinction between conditional and unconditional obligations. They’ll note that the possibilist 
obligation picks out agents’ unconditional obligations and still allows that agents can incur 
conditional obligations to act in ways that preclude them from bringing about the worst outcome.18 
So, while it’s true that possibilism entails that Alice has an unconditional obligation to <B> in 
virtue of her unconditional obligation to <B, D, H>, it may also be true that she has a conditional 
obligation to <C> given that Alice would <I> if she were to <B>. More generally, possibilists 
respond to this objection by claiming that agents have an unconditional obligation to do the best 
they can but incur conditional obligations to bring about the next best outcome if they won’t bring 
about the best outcome. While the appeal to conditional obligations renders possibilism more 
palatable, the Worst Outcome Objection nevertheless reveals an important tension between 
possibilism and consequentialist commitments.  
 
5. Actualism 
In this section, we will examine a standard form of actualism and then review two problems with 
actualism that concern the relationship between control and the truth-value of certain CFs. Here is 
a standard definition of actualism.  
 
                                                        
18 See Greenspan (1978: 81) and Zimmerman (1986: 70; 2017: 126-128). 
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Actualism: At t an agent S has an obligation to φ at t* iff, at t, S can φ at t* (t < t*), and 
what would happen if S were to φ at t* is better than what would happen if S were to 
perform any other act-set that, at t, S can perform at t*.19 
 
This standard definition of actualism implies that Alice has a t1-obligation to <C> at t2, not because 
it is contained in the best act-set that, at t1, Alice can perform over time, but rather because what 
would happen if Alice were to <C> at t2 is better than any other act that, at t1, Alice can perform 
at t2. Actualism thus avoids the worst outcome objection precisely by maintaining that true CFs at 
least partly determine an agent’s obligations.  
One problem with this definition is that it does not require φ-ing at t* to be a fully specified 
act-set, i.e. an act-set that is not contained in any other act-set that, at t, S can perform at t*.20 To 
see why ‘φ’ needs to be fully specified, consider another wedding scenario, WI2, that has the 
following deviations from WI1. 
Alice’s neighbors always have loud and disruptive parties, and, rather than <K> and <L> 
being options for Alice at t3, Alice can, at t3, perform any of the following acts at t4: 
 
K1 = <Decide to: do research and kill the neighbors at t4>   
K2 = <Decide to: do research and not kill anyone at t4> 
                                                        
19 This formulation of actualism avoids what is often referred to as the lumping problem (Wedgwood, 2009; Cariani, 
2016). A different formulation of actualism may be found in Jackson & Pargetter (1986). For a detailed overview of 
their version, and how it is different from alternative versions, see Timmerman & Cohen (2019). 
20 Note that all maximal act-sets are fully specified act-sets, but not all fully specified act-sets are maximal act-sets. 
For example, suppose that an agent has, at t1, an ability to perform a fully specified act-set <x> at t2. Hence, there is 
no act-set that is not identical to <x> that, at t1, the agent can perform at t2 that contains <x>. However, <x> itself is 
not maximal if it is contained in the following maximal act-set that the agent can, at t1, perform over time from t2-t3: 
<x, y>. 
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L1 = <Decide to: play videogames and kill anyone at t4> 
L2 = <Decide to: play videogames and not kill anyone at t4> 
 
Suppose that, as a matter of stipulation, Alice would <L2> at t4 if she were to <F> at t3, and that if 
doing research were part of the content of Alice’s decision at t4 then killing the neighbors would 
also be part of the content of Alice’s decision at t4 (the closest world in which Alice does research 
is one in which she kills the neighbors). Nevertheless, in light of the fact that, at t3, Alice can <K2> 
at t4, we may conclude that Alice is still obligated to form a decision whose content includes doing 
research since <K2> is be the best fully-specified act-set at t4 that, at t3, Alice can bring about. The 
lesson to be gleaned from this, according to Goldman (1978:186-190), is that no agent has an 
obligation even partly in virtue the truth-value of what we will call a synchronic CF—i.e. a 
counterfactual in which the antecedent and the consequent are both indexed to the same time. So, 
the following true synchronic CF does not even partly determine Alice’s obligations at t3: ‘If Alice 
were to <do research> at t4, then Alice would also <kill the neighbors> at t4’.21 This is why the 
object of an agent’s obligation in any A/P scenario must be a fully specified act-set. So, we will 
suppose that each of the act-sets mentioned in WI1 is fully specified and that the content of each 
decision implicitly excludes the performance any other number of normatively significant acts like 
killing the neighbors or donating to charity. Goldman’s remarks thus reveal that the kind of control 
an agent must have in order to have a moral obligation involves a control over the truth-value of 
the relevant synchronic counterfactuals.  
                                                        
21 This counterfactual is true since, as a matter of stipulation, both its antecedent and its consequent are true (Pollock, 
1976: 42–43; Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1986: 132). 
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Another kind of counterfactual that does not even partly determine an agent’s present 
obligations concerns what an agent would subsequently freely do if they were in the very 
circumstances in which they presently find themselves. For instance, when considering what, at t1, 
Alice ought to do at t2, all parties in the debate assume that what Alice would freely do at t2 if she 
were to <A> at t1 does not even partly determine Alice’s t1-obligations. We will call this kind of 
counterfactual an early counterfactual because the antecedent involves a time t at which an agent 
has an obligation to subsequently do something at t* (t < t*). No party in the A/P debate assumes 
that early counterfactuals even partly determine an agent’s obligations. To illustrate this point 
further, consider a scenario, WI3, that is similar to WI1, except that Alice performs <B, D> from 
t2-t3. Actualists and possibilists alike agree that, at t3, Alice ought to <H> at t4, and so the following 
true CF does not even partly determine Alice’s t3-obligation to do something at t4: ‘If Alice were 
to <D> at t3, then Alice would <I> at t4’. After all, the truth of this early counterfactual is 
incompatible with Alice’s performing <H> at t4, and at t3 Alice can do something at t4, viz. <H>, 
such that if she were to do it, then this early counterfactual would be false (Cohen & Timmerman 
2016). Having control over the truth-value of an early counterfactual highlights the importance of 
an agent’s control over their immediately available action(s). A more plausible position in the A/P 
debate must take these insights into account, and securitist views of different stripes do exactly 
that.  
 
6. Securitism 
Securitist views may be thought of as versions of actualism that took these insights into account 
and were modified to focus on the best outcome that would occur from among all of the fully 
specified act-sets that an agent can immediately perform. In this section, we will briefly review the 
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most important kinds of securitism in the literature before reviewing two of the most influential 
objections that apply to each view. Perhaps the most popular kinds of securitism are maximalist 
versions, which hold that an agent’s options at t are the jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive, 
fully specified, maximal act-sets that are securable for an agent at t.22 Here is a formal definition 
of maximalist securitism.  
 
Securitism: At t an agent S has a non-dependent obligation to φ at t* iff, φ is a fully 
specified, maximal act-set that, at t, is securable for S at t* (t < t*), and what would happen 
if S were to φ at t* is better than what would happen if S were to perform any other fully 
specified, maximal act-set that, at t, is securable for S at t*. 
 
A maximal act-set L23 is securable for S at time t if, at t, S can immediately perform the first 
moment of x, x is in L, and if x were to occur, then L would occur (Sobel 1976: 199). Not all forms 
of securitism are maximalist, however. Goldman’s version of securitism is neither maximalist nor 
omnist. Instead, Goldman (1978: 194-195) maintains that, at t, an agent can (in the relevant sense 
of “can”) perform an act-set over time only if, at t, an agent can form an intention to perform this 
act-set, the act-set is securable in virtue of the decision being causally efficacious if performed in 
the sense that the content of the decision would be actualized if the decision were to occur, and 
                                                        
22 See Goldman (1978: 202) and Portmore (2011: 179). Gustafsson’s (2014) solution to Castañeda’s (1968) formal 
critique of consequentialism appeals to jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive act-sets. Gustafsson considers his 
position to be distinct from maximalism, but Brown (2018: 66-67) persuasively argues that Gustafsson’s position is 
consistent with maximalism. 
23 Sobel (1976) refers to a maximal act-set as a “life”. 
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this content corresponds to the relevant securable act-set.24 We stipulated in WI1 that the content 
of the decisions involve all of the relevant activity up to t4 in order to make Goldman’s verdict 
about WI1 align with the verdict of maximalist versions of securitism, such as Portmore’s version. 
Both hold that Alice has a non-dependent t1-obligation to <C, F, K> from t2-t4, and that this act-
set is securable for Alice at t1 in virtue of Alice having, at t1, the ability to perform the fully 
specified singleton act-set <C> at t2. 
We now turn to the most important objections in the literature that apply to both actualism 
and securitism. The first influential objection is that both views let agents off the hook too easily 
by allowing them to avoid incurring moral obligations in virtue of their rotten moral dispositions.25 
In WI1, for instance, both views allow Alice to avoid incurring an obligation to attend the wedding 
simply because she is disposed to act wrongly if she were to freely decide to accept the invitation. 
With respect to securitist views, it matters that it is not securable at t1 for Allice to both attend the 
wedding and refrain from drinking (Timmerman 2015; Vessel 2016). Nevertheless, at t1, attending 
the wedding is easily securable for her, and if Alice were to attend, then not drinking would be 
easily securable for her at t3.26 But, it seems, agents shouldn’t get out of having to do good things 
just because they’re disposed to do bad things. This objection may be stated more precisely as 
follows.  
 
                                                        
24 Cf. Bykvist (2002: 50-51). 
25 However, see Timmerman & Swenson (2019) for an argument that possibilism is subject to an analogue problem.  
26 We take it that some actions are more difficult to perform than others. Fill out this account whichever way you like, 
and suppose that each securable act is easy to perform in this sense.  
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The Not Demanding Enough Objection: Actualism and securitism permit an agent S to 
avoid incurring any moral obligation to φ, which S can easily fulfill, simply in virtue of S’s 
rotten moral character.27  
 
The second influential objection is that both views prescribe the agent to perform harmful 
actions even when the agent can refrain from performing any such harmful actions. To take an 
extreme example, in certain cases they could require someone to murder five innocent people if 
they would otherwise murder six innocent people even though (everyone agrees) the agent can 
refrain from murdering anyone. In the less extreme example of WI1, both views entail that, at t1, 
Alice has a dependent obligation to <C> at t2 and that, as a result, actualism and securitism 
prescribe the bad behavior of breaking a promise to attend someone’s wedding. That’s not quite 
as bad as murdering five innocent people, but it still seems objectionable given that Alice can 
attend the wedding and be pleasant. This objection may be formulated more precisely as follows.  
 
The Bad Behavior Objection: Actualism and securitism prescribe bad behavior, and 
acting on such prescriptions presumably renders28 an agent S immune from moral criticism, 
even when S can easily refrain from such behavior.29  
 
                                                        
27 Jackson & Pargetter, 1986: 240; Zimmerman, 2006: 156; Portmore, 2011: 207; Baker, 2012:  642-3); Timmerman, 
2015: 1,512-1,513. 
28 This is not strictly entailed by actualism, but it is entailed by actualism coupled with widely accepted axioms about 
moral blameworthiness.  
29 Wedgwood, 2009; Ross, 2013; Timmerman & Cohen, 2016; Zimmerman, 2017: 121. 
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In the next section we analyze an underexplored objection, the nonratifiability problem, 
and argue that, contrary to what has been assumed, all versions of actualism and securitism are 
subject to this problem. This will also help motivate hybridism, which we discuss in section 8.  
 
7. The Nonratifiability Problem   
Securitists such as Goldman (1978: 202) and Portmore (2011: 179, 181-182), maintain that, in 
WI1, Alice has at least three dependent t1-obligations to <C> at t2, <F> at t3, and <K> at t4, 
respectively, and that Alice has these obligations in virtue of having a non-dependent t1-obligation 
to <C, F, K> from t2-t4. Moreover, both agree that Alice has a (non-dependent) t3-obligation to 
<K> at t4, which is exactly what we would expect given that Alice violates no obligation (according 
to both actualism and securitism) from t2-t3, and given that Alice has a (dependent) t1-obligation 
to <K> at t4. However, here’s a problem for such views. Fulfilling one’s obligations during some 
period of time does not guarantee a consistency among an agent’s various dependent singleton 
obligations across time. To see the problem, consider a revised version of the wedding case, WI4, 
in which Alice performs <L> rather than <K> at t4, and so the following CF that is false in WI1 is 
true in WI4: ‘If Alice were to <F> at t3, then she would <L> at t4’. Let’s also suppose that Alice 
has the following additional option in our new case, WI4:  
 
M = Decide to: decline the wedding invitation at t2, and then go home and play videogames 
from t3-t4 
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WI4 reveals that both actualism and securitism allow for a conflict among an agent’s 
obligations across time, even when an agent never violates an obligation during that interval of 
time. Both views hold that Alice has a dependent t1-obligation to <L> at t4 in virtue of having a 
non-dependent t1-obligation to perform a maximal act-set that contains <L>. Alice has this non-
dependent t1-obligation because such an act-set is a better securable one for Alice at t1 than any 
other securable act-set for Alice at t1 that does not contain <L>, viz. <B, D, I> (+5 > -20). 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether Alice performs <F> or <G> at t3, Alice has a t3-obligation to 
<K> rather than <L> at t4 (+15 > +5), even though <L>, and not <K>, is one of Alice’s dependent 
t1-obligations. Ross (2012: 87-89) calls this phenomenon the nonratifiability problem: actualism 
and securitism make nonratifiable prescriptions, i.e. prescriptions that will inevitably be reversed 
prior to the time of the act, no matter what the agent does prior to that act.  
There is a specific sense in which actualism and securitism appear not to be action-guiding 
in light of these conflicting obligations across time; it is difficult to see in what sense Alice has a 
t1-obligation to <L> at t4 since, no matter what she does prior to t4—and, we would like to 
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emphasize, even if she never violates an obligation prior to t4—Alice lacks a t3-obligation to <L> 
at t4. Possibilism, by contrast, faces no such problem: just as Alice has a dependent t1-obligation 
to <H> at t4 (in virtue of having a non-dependent t1-obligation to <B, D, H> from t2-t4), Alice 
would similarly have a t3-obligation to <H> at t4 if Alice were to <B, D> from t2-t3.  
We think that the nonratifiability problem raises additional unexplored difficulties for 
actualism and securitism. But before we explore such difficulties, we will first turn to Ross’s theory 
and explain how it aims to avoid the nonratifiability problem. We will argue that, contrary to what 
Ross claims, his theory is not immune to the nonratifiability problem. Here is Ross’s (2012: 91) 
version of securitism. 
 
Momentwise Wide-scope Securitism (MWSS): For any x and t, at t, x ought to be such 
that, for all t' from t forward, x satisfies the following conditional: For all Φ, if whether x 
Φs does not causally depend on the intentions x has after t', and if every maximally 
preferable option that is directly securable for x at t' involves Φ-ing, then x Φs.  
 
Like WI4, Ross considers a case that highlights the nonratifiability problem. Here is a summary of 
the case (Ross 2012: 87-88): 
 
Satan’s School for Girls On June 6 2011 Sally is about to be kidnapped by Satanists and 
incorporated into Satan’s School for Girls. On June 6 2016 Sally can kill her firstborn child 
(for the prince of darkness) either by cutting off her child’s head or by bludgeoning her 
child to death with an axe, and Sally can also refrain from killing her child. However, while 
both cutting off her child’s head in 2016 and killing her child with an axe in 2016 are 
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securable for Sally in 2011, refraining from killing her child in 2016 is not securable for 
Sally in 2011. In other words, even if Sally were to decide in 2011 to refrain from killing 
her child in 2016, she would still kill her child in 2016.  
 
The best maximal act-set that is securable for Sally on June 6, 2011 involves cutting off her child’s 
head on June 6 2016 (this form of death is less painful). However, at the relevant time on June 6, 
2016, the best maximal act-set that is securable for Sally involves refraining from killing her child 
in 2016. Like WI4, we may wonder in what sense Sally has a 2011-obligation to kill her child in 
2016 since, even if Sally fulfills all of her obligations up to June 6 2016, Sally will not be obligated 
to follow through on her 2011-obligation to cut off her child’s head. Now, Ross claims that, unlike 
securitism, MWSS avoids the nonratifiability problem: 
 
MWSS implies that, on June 6, 2011, Sally is under an obligation to refrain from killing 
her firstborn child five years later. For MWSS implies that, on June 6, 2011, Sally ought 
to be such that, on June 6, 2016, she satisfies the conditional (if whether Sally refrains from 
killing her firstborn child on June 6, 2016 does not depend on her intentions after that time 
[i.e. after a point in time on June 6, 2016], and if every maximally preferable option that is 
directly securable for Sally on June 6, 2016 involves refraining from killing her firstborn 
child, then she refrains from killing her firstborn child). And, given the description of the 
case, come what may, Sally will satisfy the antecedent of this conditional. Thus, the only 
way Sally can satisfy this conditional is by refraining from killing her firstborn child on 
June 6, 2016. MWSS therefore implies that, on June 6, 2011, Sally is under an obligation 
to refrain from killing her firstborn child five years later (Ross 2012: 92; italics added). 
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The first thing to notice about MWSS is that the times “for all t’ from t forward” refer to 
the times when an agent has an obligation and that the obligatory act, Φ-ing, is implicitly also 
indexed to a time. It’s important to be clear about this distinction, then, in order to accommodate 
the fact that we may have the same kind of obligation at different times to do something at some 
future time. For example, possibilism, actualism, and securitism agree that in WI1 Alice has both 
a t2-obligation and a t3-obligation to <K> at t4.  
Now, Ross’s claim that MWSS avoids the nonratifiability problem relied on a claim about 
Sally’s 2016-obligation (notice the parts that we italicized), notwithstanding the fact that Ross says 
“on June 6, 2011, Sally ought to be such that, on June 6, 2016” which is not captured in the 
definition of MWSS, nor does it make any difference to what is being claimed since it is true at all 
times that Sally has a 2016-obligation to refrain from killing her firstborn child in 2016.30     
When we turn to ask what, according to MWSS, Alice’s 2011-obligation is, MWSS seems 
to imply that, on June 6, 2011, Sally is obligated to cut off her child’s head on June 6, 2016. This 
is because, at all times, Sally ought to be such that on June 6, 2011 she satisfies the following 
conditional: (if whether Sally refrains from killing her firstborn child on June 6, 2016 does not 
depend on her intentions after June 6, 2011, and if every maximally preferable option that is 
directly securable for Sally on June 6, 2011 involves refraining from killing her firstborn child, 
then she refrains from killing her firstborn child). On June 6, 2011 Sally satisfies this conditional 
by failing to satisfy the second conjunct of the antecedent: no maximally preferable option that is 
directly securable for Sally on June 6, 2011 involves refraining from killing her firstborn child. 
                                                        
30 A bit more precisely, Sally has an obligation at t (which is in 2016) to decide at some time t* after t (which is also 
in 2016) to refrain from killing her firstborn child (in 2016).  
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Since Sally need not satisfy the conditional by satisfying the consequent, MWSS does not imply 
that, on June 6, 2011, Sally is obligated to refrain from killing her firstborn child on June 6, 2016. 
Instead, MWSS seems to imply that, on June 6, 2011, Sally is obligated to kill her firstborn child 
on June 6, 2016. This is because Sally ought to be such that on June 6, 2011 she satisfies the 
following conditional: (if whether Sally kills her firstborn child on June 6, 2016 does not depend 
on her intentions after June 6, 2011, and if every maximally preferable option that is directly 
securable for Sally on June 6, 2011 involves killing her firstborn child, then she kills her firstborn 
child). Since the antecedent of this conditional is true, the only way for Sally to satisfy this 
conditional is by satisfying the consequent. Hence, MWSS seems to imply that, on June 6, 2011, 
Sally is obligated to kill her child on June 6 2016. So, like securitism, MWSS similarly succumbs 
to the nonratifiability problem. In order to cement this conclusion, let’s consider what MWSS says 
about WI4. 
MWSS says that Alice ought to be such that, at t2, she satisfies the following conditional: 
(if whether Alice <L-s> at t4 does not depend on her intentions after t2, and if every maximally 
preferable option that is directly securable for Alice at t2 involves <L-ing> at t4, then she <L-s> at 
t4). Since Alice satisfies the antecedent of this conditional, the only way to satisfy the conditional 
is by satisfying its consequent. So, MWSS implies that Alice has a t2-obligation to <L> at t4. 
However, MWSS also implies that Alice has a t3-obligation to <K> rather than <L> at t4 because 
Alice satisfies the antecedent of the  following conditional, (if whether Alice <K-s> at t4 does not 
depend on her intentions after t3, and if every maximally preferable option that is directly securable 
for Alice at t3 involves <K-ing> at t4, then she <K-s> at t4), and so the only way to satisfy the 
conditional is by satisfying the consequent. So, it seems that, like actualism and other forms of 
securitism, Ross’s version of securitism is, in fact, subject to the nonratifiability problem.   
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The nonratifiability problem is, we believe, underexplored in the literature. This may be 
because actualists and securitists regard the problem as a quirky implication of their view, a small 
bullet to bite at best. However, we believe the nonratifiability problem points to a much deeper 
issue. We will argue that any view subject to the nonratifiability problem either violates ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ (OIC) or is committed to an implausible position on the relationship between 
dependent and non-dependent obligations. As such, any view subject to the nonratifiability 
problem should be rejected.  
Consider a case, WI5, that is just like WI4, except that we add the following stipulations: 
Alice is a fully rational agent from t1-t2,31 and she knows from t1-t2 that, no matter what happens 
up until t3, she won’t have a t3-obligation to <L> at t4. Given these stipulations, it follows that 
Alice cannot, at t1, <M> at t2 if we embrace the following principle:  
 
(The Rationality-Ability Principle) A fully rational agent S cannot, at t, decide at t* (t < 
t*) to perform an action x at t** (t* < t**) if S knows from t - t* that, no matter what 
happens up until t**, S will have, after t* and prior to t**, decisive reason to refrain from 
x-ing at t**. 
 
Given the stipulations of WI5 and the truth of the Rationality-Ability Principle, it follows in WI5 
that, at t1, Alice cannot <M> at t2 because part of the content of <M> includes playing videogames 
at t4, and Alice knows that, no matter what happens up until t3, Alice lacks a t3-obligation to play 
                                                        
31 One might object that Alice must not be a fully rational agent from t1-t2 in WI5 because she performs <C> at t2, and, 
for some reason, this is not what a fully rational agent would do in these circumstances. Even if this is right, we can 
add the further stipulation that WI5 remains silent on what Alice in fact does at t2. 
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(and decide to play) videogames at t4. Despite Alice’s inability at t1 to <M> at t2, it seems at first 
glance that securitism is committed to the position that Alice has a t1-obligation to <M> at t2 which 
would violate OIC. But suppose the securitist says in response that, since OIC is obviously true, it 
must not be the case that Alice has such a t1-obligation after all. Then what, we may ask, is Alice 
obligated at t1 to do at t2 according to securitism?  
Can securitists claim that Alice has a t1-obligation to <C> at t2? If Alice has a dependent 
t1-obligation to <C> at t2, this must be in virtue of Alice’s non-dependent t1-obligation to <C, F, 
L> from t2-t4, even though the content of <C> includes doing research for a paper and not playing 
videogames. However, despite doing the right thing at both t2 and t3, Alice has a t3-obligation to 
<K> rather than <L> at t4, and, unlike <L>, the content of <K> is shared by the content of <C>. 
The shared content between <C> and <K> is exactly what we would expect if, contrary to what 
securitists claim at this point in the dialectic, Alice had a non-dependent t1-obligation to <C, F, 
K>.  
Goldman’s version of securitism (1978: 194-195) which, as discussed in the previous 
section is, strictly speaking, not a version of maximalism, appears to rule out this response since, 
in WI5, although the act-set <C, F, L> is securable for Alice at t1 in virtue of the fact that the 
performance of <C> would result in <C, F, L>, <C> would not be causally efficacious if performed 
in the sense that part of the content of <C> (doing research for a paper at t4) would not be actualized 
if Alice were to <C> at t2. Moreover, although Portmore’s (2011: 193-194; 2019: ch. 5, fn. 10) 
version of securitism is more relaxed insofar as an act-set only needs to be securable in virtue of 
an immediately performable decision whose content is quite general,32 it is unclear whether 
                                                        
32 Cf. Brown (2018: 764-766) and Gustafsson (2014: 587-588). 
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Portmore would want to allow for such a mismatch between the content of <C> and the content of 
<L>. 
Perhaps securitists would say that in WI5 Alice has a non-dependent t1-obligation to <C, 
F> from t2-t3 as opposed to <C, F, K> from t2-t4, thereby avoiding the mismatch between the 
content of <C> and the content of Alice’s non-dependent t1-obligation. However, this move 
appears untenable because, according to securitism, the act-set <C, F> is obligatory for Alice at t1 
at least partly because of its value, and its value is at least partly determined by the fact that if 
Alice were to <C, F> from t2-t3 then she would <L> at t4. To illustrate this point further, suppose 
that the value of <L> is -100 as opposed to +5. In that case, according to securitism, Alice would 
have a non-dependent t1-obligation to <B, D, I> from t2-t4 because this would be the best maximal 
act-set that is securable for Alice at t1. 
 A final way in which securitists might respond to this alleged dilemma is by simply denying 
that Alice has a t1-obligation to do anything at t2, and that the lack of an obligation is explained at 
least in part by Alice’s special knowledge of the fact that, no matter what she does up until t3, she 
will lack a t3-obligation to <L> at t4. We think that a solution to the A/P debate should be able to 
handle the stipulations in WI5 while affirming that Alice has a t1-obligation to do something at t2. 
For instance, possibilists have no difficulties maintaining that in WI5 Alice has a t1-obligation to 
<B> at t2, and no knowledge of the kind that Alice has in WI5 threatens this verdict. For example, 
if we further stipulate that in WI5 Alice knows that, no matter what she does up until t3, she lacks 
a t3-obligation to <I> at t4, this is no obstacle to the possibilist’s contention that Alice has a t1-
obligation to <B> at t2.  
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 We don’t declare possibilism victorious, however, since it is subject to the worst outcome 
objection. Instead, we propose that an alternative view, hybridism, avoids the nonratifiability 
problem as well as the other problems that plague actualism and possibilism. 
 
8. Hybridism 
The preceding discussion suggests that important desiderata for the correct view in the A/P debate 
include (i) accommodating the intuitively correct verdicts rendered by both actualism and 
possibilism, while avoiding the (ii) not demanding enough (iii) bad behavior (iv) and worst 
outcome objections and, perhaps most importantly, (v) the nonratifiability problem. For reasons 
already given, a view that can accommodate (i)-(v) should be particularly appealing to 
consequentialists. The good news for consequentialists is that there are such views, which we refer 
to collectively as hybridism. In this final section, we’ll first provide a formulation of a particular 
version of hybridism and them explain how hybridism captures the aforementioned desiderata. 
These considerations provide good reason for consequentialists to accept hybridism over its 
competitors.  
Hybrid views are unique, in part, because they posit two distinct moral “oughts”, one 
actualist in nature and one possibilist in nature. These oughts are meant to jointly track the insights 
of both actualism and possibilism, yet be immune from the five aforementioned objections. Given 
space limitations, we cannot provide a complete defense of any particular hybrid view here, so our 
goal is merely to make a prima facie case for hybridism by explaining how it satisfies the 
aforementioned desiderata. We will focus on one version of hybridism known as single obligation 
hybridism (SOH). In its simplest form, SOH posits a possibilist moral obligation that picks out the 
criterion of right, which allows SOH to (a) accommodate the intuitively correct possibilist verdicts 
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and to (b) avoid the not demanding enough objection (c) the bad behavior objection and (d) the 
nonratifiability problem. In order to (a) accommodate the intuitively correct actualist verdicts and 
(b) avoid the worst outcome objection, SOH also posits an actualist moral ought that functions as 
a sort of decision procedure. In certain cases, it prescribes performing a wrong act at one time in 
order to avoid performing an even worse act at a different time. This moral ought is an action-
guiding practical ought, not a moral obligation. SOH may be formulated more precisely as follows 
(Timmerman & Cohen, 2016: 682-683).  
 
Single Obligation Hybridism:  
 
 Possibilist Moral Obligation: At t an agent S has a possibilist moral  
obligation to φ at t' iff φ-ing at t' is part of the best series of acts that S can perform 
from t to the last moment that S can possibly perform an act. 
 
Actualist Practical Ought: At t an agent S has most practical reason to  
φ at t' iff φ-ing at t' is under S’s control at t and φ-ing at t' is either (i) identical to 
the maximally-specific possibilist obligation that S has at t, (ii) a rationally 
permissible supererogatory act, or (iii) is the least rationally impermissible, all 
things considered, act-set presently under S’s control at t. There is an act-set that 
satisfies (iii) iff no act-set presently under S’s control at t satisfies conditions (i) or 
(ii).  
  
At t an agent S has a dependent possibilist obligation to perform an act-set  
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Ψ iff (and because) at t S has a non-dependent possibilist moral obligation to 
perform an act-set Ψ*, such that Ψ is a proper subset of Ψ*. Additionally, at t, S 
dependently has most practical reason to perform act-set Ψ iff (and because) at t S 
non-dependently has most practical reason to perform an act-set Ψ*, such that Ψ is 
a proper subset of Ψ*. 
 
The technical details of SOH are not centrally important for the purposes of this chapter. 
The most important elements of the view may be understood by considering the non-technical 
description of the view that preceded the formal definition and by considering SOH's applications 
in particular cases. Consider WI1 once more. SOH entails that Alice has a possibilist moral 
obligation to <B, D, H> because this is the best maximal act-set that Alice can perform over time. 
This is the intuitively correct verdict. This feature allows SOH to avoid both the not demanding 
enough and bad behavior objections for obvious reasons. It also allows SOH to avoid the 
nonratifiability problem because Alice will always be obligated to perform each basic act that is 
part of the best set of acts she can perform at any given time. This possibilist feature of SOH makes 
it logically impossible for Alice to, at one time, have an obligation to perform an act at some future 
time and then, after only fulfilling her obligations, cease to have the future obligation in question. 
There is thus no reason to worry about SOH succumbing to the nonratifiability problem. 
At the same time, SOH is immune from the worst outcome objection because the actualist 
ought, not the possibilist obligation, is action-guiding. The actualist ought prescribes performing 
the act that would result in the best outcome from among the set of acts presently under the agent’s 
control. This practical ought, then, serves the purpose of minimizing wrongdoing in light of one’s 
present circumstances. So, in WI1, SOH entails that Alice practically ought to <C>, which would 
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result in her performing <C, F, K>. This captures the intuitively correct actualist verdict. SOH has 
this implication because, of the act-sets at t2 under Alice’s control at t1, performing <C> would 
result in the best outcome. So, SOH entails that Alice ought to perform a wrong act now (i.e. <C>) 
in order to prevent herself from performing an even worse act later (i.e. <I>). There is much more 
to be written in favor of (and against) hybridism. Indeed, there is much more to be written about 
each of these views. The considerations we raise in this section, however, should provide a least a 
presumptive case in favor of hybridism.  
  
9. Conclusion 
This chapter served a few related goals. We first traced the origins of the A/P debate to a debate 
in the deontic logic literature about the coherence of utilitarianism. We then discussed the 
relationship between time, an agent’s abilities, and their moral obligations before introducing a 
precise version of the wedding invitation case that would guide us through the chapter. Using that 
case, we reviewed the four primary views in the A/P debate, explaining their benefits and 
drawbacks from a consequentialist perspective. In doing so, we attempted to further the A/P debate 
by arguing that all forms of securitism (including Ross’s MWSS) are subject to the nonratifiability 
problem. Moreover, we argued that the nonratifiability problem is more serious than it may 
initially seem, as it either violates OIC or is committed to an implausible position on the 
relationship between dependent and non-dependent obligations. We ended by making a positive 
case for hybridism which, we argued, avoids the nonratifiability problem in addition to each of the 
other problems discussed in the chapter.33 
                                                        
33 We are grateful to Doug Portmore for very helpful feedback on this chapter. This chapter is the product of full and 
equal collaboration between its authors.  
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